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Abstract
We study how investors can use financial securities to speculate on the decrease of
house prices. Unlike most asset types, houses are subject to high trading frictions and
cannot be sold short directly. Using U.S. equity lending data from 2006 through 2013, we
find evidence that an increase in the short selling activity of real estate investment trusts
(REITs) forecasts a decrease in house prices in the subsequent month. The magnitude and
significance of this effect vary with the geographical location of the REITs’ underlying
properties and with the housing cycle.
∗Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, UK, CB2 1AG. Email:
psaffi@jbs.cam.ac.uk. Tel.: +44 1223 768491.
†IESE Business School, University of Navarra; Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Email: cver-
gara@iese.edu. Tel.: +34 93 253 4200.
Introduction
Academics have uncovered numerous examples of how data on financial markets can be
used to predict the behavior of variables in the real economy.1 However, while a substantial part
of the literature focuses on forecasting macroeconomic fundamentals and commodity prices,
less attention has been paid to the prediction of house prices. This is surprising because housing
is one of the largest asset classes in the economy. Moreover, it is difficult to hedge against or
speculate on declining house prices because houses are subject to short selling constraints and
extremely high transaction costs. In this paper, we study how short selling liquid financial
securities can be used to hedge the downside risk of house prices or to speculate on housing
market downturns. We also construct an hedging strategy based on short selling intensity to
reduce the downside risk of housing price decreases using REITs, showing that investors can
limit their losses using RETIs’ equity lending data.
The real estate market crash in 2008 provides a unique environment for this analysis. During
this period, many investors set up large short positions to speculate on decreasing house prices.2
Housing assets cannot be directly sold short. Consequently, if investors want to speculate on a
decline in housing values, they must look for an alternative that is easy to short. We examine
one channel that links financial securities (i.e., Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)) to real
assets (i.e., housing assets) and study how measures of REIT stock lending activity can forecast
house prices. Our hypotheses are based on the fact that investors can hedge, or speculate, on
1For example, (Liew and Vassalou (2000)); (Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007)); (Koijen, Van Hemert, and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2009)); and Bailey and Chan (1993)) use financial market data to forecast economic growth,
inflation, mortgage choices, and commodities, respectively.
2The book by Lewis (2010)) describes how many hedge funds tried to profit from the U.S. real estate market
crash. They used strategies such as selling futures on the Case-Shiller housing index, buying credit default swaps
(CDSs), buying collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and short selling real estate-related stocks (e.g., stocks of
home-builders and government-sponsored enterprises). However, these strategies face problems (e.g., illiquid, thin
trading or low correlation with housing returns) preventing them from being a feasible way to hedge or speculate
on decreasing house prices.
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future house price movements through financial securities whose payoffs are linked to house
prices. Because REITs are essentially portfolios of underlying real estate properties, they are
plausibly related to fundamentals of housing markets. Thus, an increase in REIT short selling
activity may forecast decreases in housing prices.
The lower transaction costs of REITs allow investors to reflect negative expectations about
real estate prices more cheaply and quickly relative to directly trading in the housing markets.
Investors with no exposure to house prices who want to speculate on, or hedge the risk of
decreasing housing prices can short REIT stocks directly. It is generally cheap to short REITs
in U.S. markets; the average REIT stock loan fee is equal to 0.23% per year, which is trivial in
monthly terms. Thus, shorting REITs can provide a cost-effective trading strategy to reduce the
downside risk of housing while investors attempt to sell the physical asset. The delay that occurs
due to frictions as real asset prices adjust to new information is the channel that links current
REIT returns to future house price changes. We develop and test three hypotheses based on
this channel, using REIT stock lending activity, hand-collected information on the geographical
location of REIT properties, and monthly housing returns from 2006 through 2013.
Our first hypothesis states that the correlation between REIT stock returns and housing
returns varies with the state of the housing market cycle. We classify each month in our sample
as being a “boom”, an “average”, or a “downturn” period.3 We find that this correlation is
close to zero during “average” periods of the housing market cycle. However, the correlation is
significantly positive during housing market downturns. These results suggest that short selling
REITs can be a good strategy to speculate on housing market downturns and hedge the downside
risk in housing markets. Specifically, the correlation between the Federal Housing Finance
3We define “boom” and “downturn” periods as months when housing returns are 1.64 standard deviations above
and below their historical sample mean, respectively. “Average” periods denote months in which housing returns
are lower than 1.64 standard deviations above and higher than 1.64 standard deviations below their historical mean
up to the month in question.
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Agency (FHFA) housing indices returns and REIT returns conditional on being in a housing
market downturn for the period 1991 through 2013 is 0.208. The equivalent unconditional
correlation is 0.058.
Our second hypothesis relates to short selling activity and house price predictability. If
investors expect that house prices will decrease, they can use correlated securities to act upon
these expectations for hedging or speculative purposes. We document that an increase in REIT
short selling activity forecasts a decrease in the following month’s house prices. Using a panel
vector autoregression (PVAR) reduced-form model (Abrigo and Love (2016))), we find that
a one standard deviation increase in the short selling activity of REITs – measured by stock
utilization leads to a 0.74 standard deviation decrease in house price returns.4 While the PVAR
model controls for the simultaneity between housing returns, REIT returns, and REIT short
sales activity, our results are also robust to controls for bid-ask spreads, turnover and the term
spread.
Our third hypothesis is related to the geographical of location of REIT properties and their
stock lending activity. The large variation in house prices across U.S. regions during the finan-
cial crisis should also lead to differences in the short selling activity of REITs. We hypothesize
that we can improve the forecasts of house prices across different areas by examining the short
selling activity of REITs and the location of their properties. We find that REITs invested in
properties located in areas that experienced a housing boom during the expansion cycle in the
2000s are more sensitive to increases in short-selling activity than REITs invested in properties
located in areas that did not experience a housing boom. We find that a one standard deviation
increase in the utilization of REITs’ with properties in regions that have experienced a relative
housing boom forecasts a 0.04 standard deviations decrease in house prices in the following
4Utilization, defined as the fraction of REIT stock loans divided by lendable supply, has a mean equal to 18.62%
and a standard deviation of 8.05%. The mean of monthly house price returns during the sample period is -0.11%
and its standard deviation is 0.70%.
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month. Furthermore, we do not find any effect for REITs with properties in regions that have
not experienced a housing boom.
Using REITs to study how the trading activity of financial securities predicts house prices
presents many advantages. First, through their dividends and capital appreciation, REITs pro-
vide a direct link between rents and capital gains in real estate markets. REITs are corporations
that invest in real estate, through either properties or mortgages. They receive favorable tax
treatment but are required to distribute 90% of their taxable income to their shareholders. Most
REITs opt to pay out all of their income for several years. They are designed to provide a
structure for investing in real estate similar to the one provided by mutual funds for investing in
stocks.5 Second, the information about the properties managed by each REIT is publicly avail-
able. Therefore, we can establish the explicit connection between those properties and house
price indices in different geographical areas. Specifically, we classify REITs in different geo-
graphical areas according to the location of their properties and link stock-level data to the house
prices of each area. Third, unlike securities used in other trading strategies (e.g., selling futures
on the Case-Shiller index), REITs are very liquid. Fourth, REITs possess a well-functioning eq-
uity lending market for investors who need to borrow shares for delivery following a short sale.
Fifth, REITs manage a large amount of assets that are representative of the real estate markets.
As of January 2014, there are 204 publicly-traded REITs present in the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database, with a total market capitalization of $719 billion.
Figure 1 provides our initial motivation. It displays the time series of REITs’ short selling
activity in terms of lendable supply (Supply) and equity loan demand (On Loan) beginning in
June 2006 as a fraction of the aggregate REITs’ total market capitalization (right axis), and
5REITs invest in different property types such as residential, retail, office, healthcare, hotels, industrial, and
self-storage. Residential properties are part of the housing markets, while the other property types are classified as
commercial real estate. Our results are robust to using data from all REITs regardless of the property type or from
residential REITs only.
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as the cumulative housing returns for REITs (left axis) grouped according to the geographical
location of their properties (housing returns are available for a longer period than short sal).
Panel A shows the short selling activity and cumulative housing returns for REITs with more
than 50% of their properties located in one of the U.S. Census regions (i.e., Northeast (Region
1), Midwest (Region 2), South (Region 3), and West (Region 4)). House prices almost doubled
in the Northeast and more than doubled in the West region from 2000 through 2007, while the
increase in prices was much lower in the Midwest and South regions for the same period. We
also observe that REITs with properties located in areas that experienced a big run-up in house
prices (e.g., REITs with properties in the West and Northeast regions) presented higher values
of the on loan and lending supply measures than REITs with properties located in areas that
experienced a small run-up in house prices (e.g., REITs with properties in the Midwest and
South regions). The loan demand of REITs with properties in the Midwest and South regions
is mostly flat throughout our sample period, while there is a large increase of loan demand for
REITs with properties in the West or the Northeast regions before Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
in September 2008. For instance, the loan demand was very similar for all the REITs in March
2007. It was around 2% of the total sector market capitalization. However, loan demand for
REITs with properties in the Northeast and the West regions almost tripled by September 2007.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Panel B of Figure 1 is similar to Panel A but splits according to Housing Boom areas No
Housing Boom areas. Housing Boom areas are defined as those in which house prices had a
cumulative run-up of 75% or more during the period of January 2000 through December 2007,
while No Housing Boom areas are those in which prices increased by less than 75%. The
aggregate lending supply of REITs with most of their properties in Housing Boom Areas was
around 33% in July 2007, similar to the 30% observed for REITs properties in areas with no
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housing boom. The amount of REITs lent out to investors more than doubled from January
2007 through September 2008, going from 5% to above 13% of market capitalization. Overall,
this figure exhibits that short selling activity is higher for REITs with most of their properties
located in Housing Boom areas than for REITs with most of their properties located in No
Housing Boom areas.
Literature Review
Our findings relate to the intersection of two research areas. First, our paper contributes
to the literature on short selling activity and price predictability. Table 1 shows the gap that
our paper fills in the literature. Some authors (e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek (1995)), Jones and
Lamont (2002)); Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002)); Boehme, Danielsen,
and Sorescu (2006)); Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007)); Nagel (2005)); Boehmer, Husza´r,
and Jordan (2010)); Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016)); and Husza´r, Tan, and Zhang
(2017))) explore the link between short interest and future stock returns. Research that specif-
ically focuses on REIT short selling activity is very thin. Li and Yung (2004)) analyze the
determinants of REIT short interest and find a negative relationship between short interest and
returns. Their results are significant only for the highest decile of REIT short interest. More
recently, Blau, Hill, and Wang (2011)) document that short selling activity is high in REITs
that perform well and low in underperforming REITs. Chen, Downs, and Patterson (2012))
consider heterogeneous beliefs and use the full cross-section of REIT short interest to test for
stock overvaluation. We are not aware of any study that has considered the link between REIT
equity lending data and the underlying housing market. Our results show that REIT short in-
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terest does not provide strong predictability.6 However, we find that the use of measures that
include information about the supply of REIT shares for short selling purposes (e.g., on loan,
utilization, and fees) improves the predictability of house prices.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Second, we contribute to the literature on market efficiency by studying how frictions in
housing markets can be exploited to speculate on decreasing house prices through financial
securities. Frictions in housing markets prevent negative information from being rapidly incor-
porated into house prices. As a result, house prices are predictable (e.g., see the predictability
tests in Campbell, Davis, Gallin, and Martin (2009)) and Corradin, Fillat, and Vergara-Alert
(2014)), and a review by Ghysels, Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov (2012)).) Studies by Gyourko
and Keim (1992)); Barkham and Geltner (1995)); Naranjo and Ling (1997)); Benjamin, Sir-
mans, and Zietz (2001)); Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005)); and Riddiough, Moriarty,
and Yeatman (2005)) analyze how REIT returns can forecast real estate prices (i.e., how fi-
nancial securities data can forecast real estate returns) and show evidence of real estate market
inefficiency. In particular, this literature documents that price information takes over a year to
be reflect by unsecuritized markets. Row (3) in Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of
the empirical approaches used in these papers.
Our paper differs from this literature along two dimensions. First, all these studies use
data from appraisals (i.e., National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF)
indices). Consequently, the delayed incorporation of information into NCREIF indices due to
infrequent property appraisals is the reason for the predictability in real estate prices observed
in the data. Geltner (1998)) documents that NCREIF indices have two sources of error: random
6Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007)) show that short interest is not a sufficient statistic to measure shorting
demand. For instance, low short interest could be due to lack of demand or high short selling constraints.
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appraisal error and the lagging of appraised values. We employ repeated sales indices of houses
(i.e., FHFA indices) instead of appraisal-based indices of income-producing commercial real
estate properties (i.e., NCREIF indices). Second, this literature does not consider the geograph-
ical location of the real estate properties owned by the REITs to exploit cross-section variation.
As a result, our findings are incremental to the papers listed in rows (2) and (3) of Table 1.
Hypotheses Development
Our hypotheses build on the idea that frictions in the real estate markets prevent negative
information (i.e., negative demand shocks to commercial or housing markets) from being in-
stantaneously incorporated into prices. As a consequence, investors try to sell short financial
securities (e.g., REITs) that are correlated with the physical asset’s income stream, incurring
lower trading costs. Variables that indicate an increase in the short selling activity of RE-
ITs capture expectations about future prices and, consequentially, about expected decreases
in house prices (e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek (1995)); Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007))).
Therefore, if investors expect house prices to decrease but cannot sell houses outright due to
trading frictions, shorting REITs might be used as a substitute strategy. While it is beyond the
scope of our paper to provide a structural model of the dynamics of REITs and house prices,
we present a reduced-form generalization of Kyle’s (1985) model to theoretically motivate our
testable hypothesis.
Theoretical Motivation
In this subsection, we set up a stylized conceptual framework to illustrate how REITs, which
typically hold commercial property, can be used to hedge housing. There are two channels by
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which commercial and housing assets are linked. First, these assets can be seen as complemen-
tary goods: a negative demand shock to housing markets (e.g., an economic shock that lowers
employment) is also likely to reduce the demand for commercial real estate. Second, a negative
demand shock for housing also has the effect of reducing the demand for common factors of
production between commercial real estate and housing (e.g., available land) and their prices.
These inputs are used in the production of commercial real estate goods, leading to a positive
supply shock and, all else equal, to lower commercial estate prices. Empirically, the correla-
tion between commercial real estate and housing (e.g., Gyourko (2009)) and Geltner, Miller,
Clayton, and Eichholtz (2001))), as well as the correlation between real estate markets and the
business cycle (e.g., Green (1997)) and Quan and Titman (1999))), have been widely docu-
mented in the real estate literature. In summary, there are several theoretical channels by which
commercial and housing prices are linked (e.g., Geltner, Miller, Clayton, and Eichholtz (2001))
and Spiegel (2001))).
We include this positive covariance between commercial real estate and house prices into
an equilibrium model of REIT stock trading that generalizes the model in Kyle (1985)).7 We
assume that there is a single risk neutral informed trader – a speculator – with superior informa-
tion about the real estate markets, who can trade shares of REITs with risk neutral uninformed
liquidity traders. Informed and uninformed traders submit orders to buy and sell stocks of RE-
ITs to a risk-neutral market-maker. The market-maker observes the aggregate order flow and
sets a price to clear the market. Because the order flow includes both informed and uninformed
trades, it provides an imperfect signal to the market maker about the information in the real
estate markets that is incorporated into prices. Risk-neutral uninformed investors trade for non-
speculative reasons. They demand a quantity u˜, which is drawn from an independent normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2u. The informed trader knows the distribution of u˜ but
7The full model is set out in more detail in the Online Appendix.
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not its actual realization.
The model has three stages with one round of trading. In the first stage, the informed trader
learns private information about the ex post commercial rents, P˜Ct , and the ex post liquidation
value, V˜ Ct .8 Because of their special tax treatment, REITs are required to pay a high fraction
of their taxable income derived from rents as dividends (αP ), as well as a high fraction of any
capital gains obtained from selling properties (αV ). Therefore, REIT dividends are αP P˜Ct +
αV V˜ Ct , where αP and αV are constant. The trader can estimate the value of the stock of REITs,
v˜, by calculating the present value of these payoffs as v˜ = (αP P˜Ct + αV V˜ Ct )/(1 + RC), where
RC is the discount rate. Similarly, she can estimate housing prices as the present value of
the cash flows generated by housing assets, P˜Ht , and their liquidation value, V˜ Ht ; that is, h˜ =
(αHP˜Ht + αV V˜
H
t )/(1 + R
H). We assume that discount rates RC and RH are constant and
known by the informed trader. In the second stage, the trade intensity of the uninformed traders,
u˜, is realized. Without knowing about u˜, the informed trader chooses her demand for REIT
shares, x˜, that maximizes her utility conditional on her private information about the real estate
markets. The choice of x˜ is the channel that drives the incorporation of information into security
prices. In the third stage, the market maker observes the aggregate net order flow, x˜ + u˜, and
sets a single stock price for the REIT, PREIT , to clear the market. This price must satisfy
PREIT (x˜+ u˜) = E[v˜|x˜+ u˜].
In equilibrium, the informed trader’s order strategy, x˜(v˜), is given by
x˜(v˜) =
[
σv
σu
]−1
[v˜ − E(v˜)] , (1)
8For simplicity, we assume that the demand shocks for commercial real estateDCt are such that the equilibrium
rents are normally distributed with mean µP and variance σ2P . Similarly, we consider that each REIT collects rents
for one period and sells its real estate properties during the next period at a price drawn from a normal distribution
with mean µV and variance σ2V . We also assume that these two normal distributions are independent.
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the price PREIT (x˜+ u˜) that the market maker sets up is
PREIT (x˜+ u˜) = E(v˜) +
1
2
σv
σu
(x˜+ u˜) (2)
where σ2v =
[
αP
1+RC
]2
σ2P +
[
αV
1+RC
]2
σ2V , E(v˜) =
αCpC
1+RC
+ αV pV
1+RC
, and the correlation between
REITs and house prices is
Cov(PREIT , h˜) =
αP
2(1 +RC)(1 +RH)
Cov(PC , PH) +
αV
2(1 +RC)(1 +RH)
Cov(V C , V H).
(3)
A few results arise from this equilibrium.9 First, equation (1) shows that if the informed
trader receives pessimistic information about rents and real estate prices that makes her current
valuation of the stock of REITs, v˜, to be lower than the expected (mean) value of v˜, then she
places a negative (i.e., short-selling) order. The size of the short-selling order increases with
the volatility of the trades of the uninformed traders, σu, and decreases with the volatility of
the signal of the value of the stock of REITs that the informed trader obtains. Second, the
REIT’s stock price in (2) is linear with the order flow (x˜ + u˜). A reduction in the demand
for stock by either informed or uninformed traders induces the market maker to infer a lower
valuation and leads to lower equilibrium prices. Thus, we expect that a higher intensity of short
selling will be associated with lower REIT stock prices. Third, the impact of the order flow on
REIT stock prices depends on the variance of the real estate market fundamentals. The second
term in the right-hand side of equation (2) shows that the variance of the value of the REIT
stock, σ2v , increases the adjustment in REIT prices to reflect the information contained in the
order flow. Besides, the variance of the value of the REIT stock depends on the variance of
rents, σ2P , and real estate assets, σ
2
C , in the geographical area where its properties are located.
Therefore, a higher variance in a particular area will increase the impact of order flow on REITs
9The Online Appendix includes the details about the equilibrium of this model.
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prices. More specifically, we expect short selling to have a larger impact in areas with higher
uncertainty in the underlying real estate fundamentals. Finally, equation (3) shows how the
stock price of REITs (i.e., financial securities) are correlated with housing (i.e., real assets)
due to the correlation between commercial and housing rents and the correlation between the
liquidation values of commercial and housing assets.
Testable Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis focuses on the time-varying correlation between REIT returns and hous-
ing returns. The historical unconditional correlation between these two variables is very low.
We conjecture that this correlation increases significantly during housing market downturns,
which is formalized in Hypothesis 1. Comparative statistics for housing market booms versus
housing market downturns (or busts) using equation (3) support this conjecture.
Hypothesis 1 The correlation between REIT returns and housing returns is higher during hous-
ing market downturns.
LetRREi,t denote the return on house prices in the geographical area i at time t,R
REIT
i,t denote
the return on REIT stock prices in the geographical area i at time t, and DBusti,t denote a dummy
variable that takes the value of one when the housing market in area i is in a downturn and zero
otherwise. We test whether the coefficient β3 of the following regression model is significantly
positive:
RREi,t = α + β1 ·RREITi,t + β2 ·DBusti,t + β3 ·RREITi,t ·DBusti,t + i,t (4)
where t is the error term. A positive coefficient of the interaction term, β3, indicates that the
correlation between the variables RREi,t and R
REIT
i,t is higher when the dummy variable D
Bust
i,t is
one; that is, during housing market downturns.
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A vast body of empirical literature on real estate explores the dynamics of REIT returns and
links them to the returns of real estate assets. For example, Clayton and MacKinnon (2001)) and
Lee, Lee, and Chiang (2008)) show that REITs only begin to exhibit a direct link to real estate
returns in the 1990s. Oikarinen, Hoesli, and Serrano (2011)), Hoesli and Oikarinen (2012))
and Boudry, Coulson, Kallberg, and Liu (2012)) show that the dynamics of the long-run REIT
market are more closely related to the real estate markets than to stock markets. Morawski,
Rehkugler, and Fu¨ss (2008)) find that REIT stocks lead the private property markets. Yunus
et al. (2012)) document international evidence of the relationship between REIT returns and the
return of real estate assets.
Hypothesis 2 An increase in REIT short selling activity forecasts a reduction in the next month’s
house prices.
The link between the real asset (i.e., housing) and the financial security (i.e., REITs) is the
basis of our empirical tests on whether proxies for short selling activity can be used to forecast
house prices. Housing assets cannot be directly sold short. Consequently, if investors want
to speculate on a decline in housing values, then they must look for an alternative that is easy
to short. Thus, an increase in REIT short selling activity indicates that investors are betting
on decreases in REIT stock prices, which are driven by the fundamental value of real estate
markets. Notice that the conditional expectation of h˜ given x˜ is
E[h˜|x˜ = x] = E(h˜) +
[
σ2u
σ2v
]− 1
2
x. (5)
That is, there exists a linear relationship between house prices and the informed trader demand
for REIT shares.
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This equation shows that an increase in short selling by informed investors (i.e., a decrease
in the order flow, x) induces a downward revision of beliefs about the value of the real asset
(i.e., a decrease in the conditional expectation of the housing value, E[h˜|x˜ = x]). Equation
(5) also shows that the higher the uncertainty about the underlying real estate markets, σ2v , the
larger the impact that the order flow, x, will have on the conditional expectation about the value
of the real estate asset, h.10
Finally, we study the geographical cross-section of short selling activity. While average
house prices decreased in all U.S. areas and REIT short selling activity increased during the
recent housing bust, Figure 1 shows that these effects differed across regions. REITs with a
majority of properties located in Boom areas present higher short selling activity than REITs
with their majority of properties in No Boom areas. Moreover, equation (1) shows that the
effect of REIT short selling activity on house prices is stronger in areas that display higher
volatility or higher σ2v (e.g., areas that have experienced a larger price run-up). Therefore,
areas that experienced smaller house price run-ups before the financial crisis in 2008 should be
less affected by increases in short selling activity. Our third and last hypothesis tests whether
areas that experienced higher house price run-ups before the financial crisis in 2008 were more
affected by increases in short selling activity. Hypothesis 3 formalizes this conjecture.
Hypothesis 3 Short sales of REITs with properties located in areas with a larger price run-up
during the period January 2000-December 2007 forecast a higher decrease in house prices.
The economic intuition goes as follows. If house prices in some areas had increased sharply
and a major correction in prices is expected, then we would expect investors to take action.
Investors should take short positions on financial securities that are correlated with the housing
10Recall that the variance of the value of the REIT stock depends on the variance of rents, σ2P , and real estate
assets, σ2V . These variables depend on the business cycle.
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market in bad times. Because REIT returns are highly correlated with housing returns during
housing market downturns (i.e., Hypothesis 1), an increase in REIT short selling activity fore-
casts a reduction in the next month’s house prices (i.e., Hypothesis 2) and should indicate an
even stronger relationship in areas with a higher expected housing market downturns (i.e., areas
with a housing boom).
Data and Empirical Methodology
Description of the Data
We use United States data due to the availability of information about REIT short selling
activity, along with house price indices for different geographical region at monthly frequencies.
We match data from the CRSP-Ziman REIT database to a proprietary dataset of lending supply
postings and stock loans provided by Markit. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011)) and Porras Prado,
Saffi, and Sturgess (2016)) provide further details on these equity lending data. The information
is collected daily from 125 custodians and 32 prime brokers; Markit estimates that the data cover
more than 85% of global equity lending. Out of the 257 REITs present in CRSP from July 2006
through July 2013, we can match 245 to our equity lending data. We also collect information on
REIT returns, market capitalization, bid-ask spreads, average daily turnover, and short interest
data from CRSP/Compustat.
The equity lending data present daily information on the quantity of shares available to bor-
row, the shares effectively lent out, and the loan-weighted average fee.11 We employ three main
11Note that equity loans are not a perfect measure of short selling since they might be used as part of tax-arbitrage
strategies or hedging strategies (see Christoffersen, Geczy, and Musto (2005)); however the vast majority of loans
are made with the purpose of delivering shares following a short sale.)
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variables to capture short selling intensity: (i) On Loan is the value of shares lent out relative to
market capitalization of REITs with property holdings in that area at time t-1, (ii) Utilization is
defined as the amount on loan divided by the value of the supply of shares available to borrow,
and (iii) Short Interest Ratio is the value of shares sold short reported in Compustat relative to
the total market capitalization.12 Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001)), Chen and
Singal (2003)), and Arnold, Butler, Crack, and Zhang (2005)) construct similar measures for
their studies, but ours is the first to use REIT equity lending data as a proxy for short selling
activity.
We use the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) House Price Indices as our main
measures of house prices. They are weighted, repeat-sales indices and are available at a monthly
frequency for the aggregate U.S. housing market and each U.S. Census Divisions.13 We obtain
data on Treasury bond yields from Datastream, defining Term Spread (10y - 3m) as the differ-
ence between the 10-year and the 3-month Treasury bond yields. We also use the Moody’s/RCA
Commercial Property Price Indices (CPPI) in our empirical analyses. They are are weighted,
repeat-sales indices, which are computed using contemporaneous transaction-price-based data
on private deals. There are specific CPPI indices for different property types (e.g., apartment,
retail, industrial, office-central, office-suburban, and hotel). The CPPI data are available at a
monthly frequency only for the aggregate U.S. housing market, not for U.S. metropolitan areas.
Given that REITs have a wide range of investment strategies (e.g., commercial, residential,
or industrial properties), we perform our tests using three alternative sets of REITs. The baseline
set (All REITs) uses all REITs included in the CRSP-Ziman database, regardless of whether
they focus on residential or commercial real estate. We find even stronger results if we use
12On Loan does not take into account the lendable supply available. Thus, an increase in On Loan may be due
to a decrease in short selling constraints rather than to the arrival of negative information. Utilization can better
capture the intensity of short sales constraints.
13This is the largest level of granularity available at the monthly frequency. We use the purchase-only indices.
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only Residential REITs (i.e. those with the property type variable PTYPE=8 in the CRSP-
Ziman database). Finally, we match apartments-focused REITs (i.e., those with PTYPE=8 and
PSUB=2) to forecast the CPPI Apartment Index as an additional robustness test. These three
sets of REITs (All REITs, Residential REITs, Apartments-only REITs) and two real estate
indices (the FHFA housing price index and the apartments CPPI) provide us with alternative
ways to test Hypothesis 2.
Table 2 presents monthly summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analyses.
There is an average of 114 REITs with an average market capitalization of $5.13 billion. The
average equal-weighted monthly individual REIT’s return in the period is positive (0.99%) but it
has a high standard deviation (7.86%), reflecting the large price fluctuations observed during our
sample period. Examining the short selling measures, we find that an average of 29% of REIT
market capitalization is available to borrow (Supply), with 6.41% actually being lent out. The
large slack supply available to borrow is captured by the 18.62% average value for utilization,
meaning that less than a quarter of lendable shares is effectively lent out, similar to numbers
observed in the aggregate U.S. stock market (Porras Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2016))).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Classification of REITs According to the Location of Their Properties
We match the returns on the FHFA House Price Indices calculated for each U.S. Census
region with REIT data in the CRSP-Ziman database. We hand-collect data on the composition
of each REIT property portfolio and classify all REITs into ten groups based on the geograph-
ical location of their underlying properties using U.S. Census regions. First, U.S. states are
divided into four main regions: West (Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Mon-
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tana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico); Northeast (Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania); Midwest (North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio); and South (Kentucky, Tennessee, Mis-
sissippi, Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana). We ex-
amine the U.S. Census region level because too few REITs hold properties that are confined
mainly to a single U.S. state. Most of the REITs are diversified across several states and it is not
possible to classify REITs at the U.S. state level according to the locations of their properties.
We allocate each REIT to a particular state and region according to the location of its prop-
erties. If more than 50% of a REIT’s investment are located in one of the four U.S. Census
regions, then it is classified as part of that specific regional group; that is, Northeast, Midwest,
South, and West. If no single region contains more than 50% of the REIT’s properties, but the
REIT has more than 50% of its properties in a combination of two regions, we then create a
group for the specific two-region combination. The pairs Northeast+South, Northeast+West,
Midwest+South, and South+West contain at least one REIT. Mixing single regions with mixed
regions produces eight regional groups. If the REIT has properties spanning different regions
but no combination of two regions account for more than 50% of the REIT’s properties, then
the REIT is classified as Diversified. REITs that do not fall into any of the categories above are
excluded from our multivariate analysis.
Finally, because our main goal is to examine differences between REITs exposed to areas
that have experienced a boom in house prices and those that did not, we group the REITs
within the eight regional groups described above two categories: Boom and No Boom areas.
Boom areas are defined as those in which house prices had a cumulative run-up equal to or
greater 75% during the period January through December 2007, while No Boom areas are those
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areas in which prices increased by less than 75%. These criteria aim to separate regions that
experienced a large price run-up during the expansion cycle of the housing markets in the 2000s
(mostly in the Northeast and the West) from those that did not (mostly in the Midwest and the
South). Our results are robust to alternative choices of the starting month to compute the price
run-up (e.g, January 2000), the ending month that represents a month at the peak of the housing
cycle (e.g., December 2007), and to alternative levels of cumulative price increases (e.g., 75%).
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the number of REITs in each group per month.
From Panel A, the majority of REITs (i.e., an average of 62.30 observations per month) have
geographically diversified investments. Our dataset contains an average of 4.04, 1.00, 13.24,
and 4.93 REITs each month within the categories Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, respec-
tively. South+West is the most populated category within those that contain REITs with most
of their properties in two regions. We have dropped from our sample REITs that invest only
in mortgages and unclassified REITs. In Panel B, we report that the average number of REITs
with properties located in No Boom areas is 25.39, approximately twice as many as those in
Boom areas.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Moreover, Table 3 shows the link between REIT short selling activity and the geographical
location of their properties. It shows that REITs with a majority of properties located in the
Northeast and the West have higher Supply (35.29% and 35.38%, respectively) and On Loan
(8.08% and 10.29%) than those with a majority of properties located in the Midwest and South
(18.17% and 29.31% Supply, and 2.81% and 7.42% On Loan, respectively). At the aggre-
gate level, REITs with a majority of properties located in Boom areas present higher Supply
(35.22%), On Loan(10.30%) and Short Interest Ratio (8.75%) than the REITs with a majority
of properties located in No Boom areas (28.36%, 7.44%, and 6.85%, respectively).
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Measures of Housing Returns
Before describing our empirical methodology, it is important to discuss the validity of the
measures of housing returns that we use. First, we use FHFA indices, which track single-
family residential property values, as the main measure for computing the housing returns in
our analyses. We use purchase-only indices, which include only transaction prices (i.e., they do
not include appraisals on mortgage refinances). These repeat-sales indices minimize the lag and
smoothing of housing data because they are based on transaction prices rather than on appraised
values. It is also important to note that most of the assets used to compute the purchase-only
FHFA indices are owner-occupied properties rather than rental properties.
We also use the Moodys/RCA Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI) as an additional
robustness measure to calculate housing returns.14 Because we focus our study on the prediction
of house prices, we specifically use the apartment CPPI. As with the purchase-only FHFA index,
this index is based on transaction prices for residential properties. However, the apartment
CPPI includes transaction prices only of renter-occupied residential properties. We observe a
strong relationship between renter and owner-occupied residential property values. Finally, the
monthly reported value of the CPPI is explicitly a lagged moving average of the values for the
preceding three months. However, our PVAR approach accounts for the autocorrelation of the
housing returns and, therefore, addresses any problems caused by the lagged moving average.15
Empirical Methodology
Standard OLS regressions do not account for the possible reverse causality of the explana-
tory variables. For instance, REIT short selling activity, housing returns and REITs returns
14See Sun, Yang, and Zhao (2012)) for a highly detailed analysis of commercial real estate indices.
15Our results hold for the PVAR model with two, three and four lags.
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might be endogenously determined because they all depend on future expectations about house
prices. To address this issue, our main empirical setup is based on a panel vector autoregression
(PVAR) reduced-form model (Abrigo and Love (2016))). This approach allows us to estimate
the joint dynamics of house price returns, REIT returns, and short selling variables as in Holtz-
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988)) and Pesaran and Smith (1995)). Although PVAR models are
commonly used in the macroeconomic literature, they are not widely used in finance and real
estate economics. The use of a PVAR model has three advantages in our setup: (i) it captures the
dynamic relationships among all the time series in the analysis, (ii) it allows for heterogeneity
among different panel units, and (iii) the reduced-form specification assumes that all dependent
variables in the system are endogenously determined.
For a given set of variables, the first-order PVAR specification is given by:
zi,t = Γ0 + Γ1zi,t−1 + Γ2xi,t−1 + fi + θt + i,t (6)
where zi,t denotes the vector of endogenously determined variables (i.e., short selling activity,
RREIT , and RFHFA); xi,t−1 denotes exogenous control variables (i.e., REIT bid-ask spread,
REIT turnover, and the term spread of interest rates); and i,t is the error term. Let i denote
each group according to the geographical location of REIT properties and let t denote time.
Group fixed-effects (fi) control for any heterogeneity due to unobservable characteristics in
each geographically-based group and monthly time-effects are captured by θt. The PVAR spec-
ification assumes that each cross-sectional group follows the same underlying structure, with
fixed coefficients (Γ1 and Γ2) for all different groups in the panel. The main benefit of this ap-
proach is that we can exploit the cross-sectional variation in house prices to improve the quality
of our estimates, given the small sample size available for regional housing price indices at a
monthly frequency.
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Empirical Results
In this section, we test the hypotheses described in Section . First, we test the hypothesis on
the conditional correlation between REIT and housing returns. Second, we test the hypothesis
on short selling activity and house price predictability. Third, we test the hypothesis on the
geographical cross-section of short selling activity and house price predictability.
Conditional Correlations between REIT and Housing Returns
A necessary condition for using REITs to hedge or speculate on house price fluctuations
is that the returns of these two assets are correlated, such that investors can use the financial
security (i.e. REITs) to capture movements in the real asset (i.e., house prices). However, the
returns of the FHFA House Price Index exhibit a very low unconditional correlation with their
matched REIT returns, equal to 0.04 in our sample.16 Thus, we begin our empirical analysis
by testing to see if the correlation between REIT and housing returns is higher during market
downturns.
Panel A of Table 4 displays the initial tests of Hypothesis 1. Column 1 shows the correla-
tion between the FHFA housing returns (RFHFA) and CRSP-Ziman REIT market index returns
(RREIT ) for the four geographical U.S. Census regions and for the aggregate U.S. market from
February 1991 to December 2010. In columns (2) and (3), we calculate the conditional corre-
lations in periods of housing market downturn (Bust periods) and no housing market downturn
(No Bust periods); that is, cyclical counterparts to the “boom” and “average” periods of the
housing market cycle. Periods of housing market downturns in a given region are defined as
16They also present a negative correlation with measures of short selling activity, REIT stock turnover, 10-year
Treasury yield, and term spread. The online appendix to this paper presents the correlation structure among the
main variables that we use in the empirical analyses.
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those months in which returns on the FHFA index are 1.64 standard deviations below the his-
torical mean up to that particular month.
Two main results arise from this table. First, we find a positive and significant correlation
between RFHFA and RREIT in the full sample, equal to 0.075. Second, this correlation varies
significantly according to the state of the housing market. During periods of housing market
downturns, we find a positive correlation for all regions except the Northeast. For example,
the correlation equals 0.299 for All Regions in column (2). During non-downturn periods, the
correlation is in fact negative and statistically significant for all regions except the Northeast,
which is negative but not significant. This means that REITs returns tend to be below average
when the FHFA housing index returns are above-average. In all cases, the difference between
downturn (Bust) and no-downturn (No Bust) periods is statistically significant.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Rather than displaying correlations, Panel B of Table 4 shows estimates for the regression
specified in Eq. (4) for each U.S. Census region and for the pooled sample. We regress housing
returns (RFHFA) on REIT returns (RREIT ), a dummy for the periods of housing downturn (Bust
Dummy), and the interaction term RREIT× Bust Dummy. First, we find that the coefficient for
RREIT is negative and statistically significant in all cases. Second, the coefficient for RREIT×
RE Bust Dummy is positive and significant in all cases, as Hypothesis 1 states. We find a
larger and positive correlation between RFHFAi,t and R
REIT
i,t during housing downturns (i.e., RE
Bust Dummy=1). The null hypothesis that the sum of RREIT× RE Bust Dummy and RREIT
coefficients is equal to zero is rejected in all cases. These results are equivalent to the ones that
we provide in Panel A and support Hypothesis 1; that is, the correlations between REIT and
housing returns are higher during economic downturns.
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Short Selling Activity and House Price Predictability
We examine the question of whether short selling activity can forecast the next month’s
house prices. Hypothesis 2, posits that higher levels of short selling activity predict lower
house prices in the future. To test this hypothesis we use the panel VAR (PVAR) multivariate
regressions described in Section 2. Before estimating the PVAR model, we use the panel unit
root test developed by Choi (2001)) on each of the short selling variables to rule out non-
stationarity. Results in Panel A of Table 5 reject the null hypothesis that the short sales measures
contain a unit root.17
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
We also test for the optimum number of lags to use in the PVAR. Panel B exhibits the lag-
selection analysis using On Loan as the measure of short selling. Results indicate that one lag is
the optimal choice for the empirical analysis regardless of whether we use the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), or the Hannan-Quinn information
criterion (HQIC). The results are similar for other short selling measures.
Table 6 displays the results of the PVAR models that we use to test Hypothesis 2. The
panel is composed of three categories: Boom (No Boom) is defined as U.S. Census regions
in which house prices had a cumulative run-up equal to or greater than (less than) 75% from
January 2000 through December 2007 and Diversified is the the U.S. as a whole. We use the
population-weighted FHFA House Price Index for each U.S. Census region to compute hous-
ing returns for Boom and No Boom, using the aggregate U.S. FHFA index for the Diversified
category. We estimate specifications with three alternative measures of lagged short selling
17In unreported results we have also explored the existence of a cointegrating vector among house prices, REIT
index levels, and equity lending variables, but cannot find any evidence to support this hypothesis.
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activity: (i) Utilization i,t−1; (ii) On Loani,t−1, and (iii) Short Interest Ratioi,t−1. As further con-
trol variables, we use the lagged returns on the equal-weighted CRSP-Ziman aggregate index
(Lag Ret(REIT)) to account for the expectations about future prices embedded in REIT stock
returns, the average bid-ask spreads (Bid-Ask Spread (%)) and log turnover (Ln(Turnover)) to
control for liquidity, and the term spread between short and long maturity Treasury bonds (Term
Spread (10y - 3m)). We compute stock market characteristics by equal-weighting data for all
REITs with properties in a particular group.18 In columns (1)-(3), we find that all short selling
measures can forecast housing prices in the following month. For example, the -0.064 coef-
ficient estimate for utilization (U) in column (3) means that a one standard deviation increase
in utilization leads to a 0.074 standard deviation decrease in house price returns, supporting
Hypothesis 2.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
A potential issue with the results in columns (1)-(3) is that they use data based on all RE-
ITs regardless of the property types that form their investments (e.g., residential, retail, office,
healthcare, hotels, industrial, and self-storage), rather than just residential REITs, to forecast
house prices. Thus, our results could be affected by REITs that are unrelated to housing assets
but that are still included in the calculation of short sales measures. As a robustness test, the
panel VARs shown in columns (4)-(6) (Residential-only REITs) compute short selling activity
using only REITs that focus on residential real estate (i.e., those with the variable PTYPE=8
in the CRSP-Ziman dataset). About 5% of REITs in our sample are classified as being resi-
dential only, meaning that the number of REITs with available short sales data in each region
is small (i.e., it ranges from three to four per region). The inherent noise from such a small
sample works against the power of our tests, but we expect our results to be unaltered because
18For Diversified we use REITs with properties spread out over different regions but with no combination of any
two regions accounting for more than 50% of any REIT’s portfolio
25
variation in residential REIT financial variables, like returns and short sales activity, should be
even more closely related to underlying housing prices. If investors want to hedge the risk of
decreasing house prices by shorting REITs, then the average variation in the short selling in-
tensity of residential REITs would be a stronger predictor than the average variation computed
by using all types of REITs with investments in a particular region. This is exactly what we
find, with results being very similar to those estimated in columns (1)-(3) but with lower stan-
dard errors. We also find that the ability of REIT returns (RREITt ) to forecast increases in real
estate returns (RREt ) is very weak in VARs. This means that REITs stocks incorporate informa-
tion faster than house price indices and, more importantly, that measures of REIT short selling
activity are better predictors of real estate returns than REITs stocks. These results show the
importance of addressing the endogeneity issues among house prices, REIT returns, and short
selling measures.
A majority of REITs make their investments in commercial rather than residential real es-
tate. As an additional test of our hypothesis, we estimate a standard VAR in columns (7)-(9)
using Apartments-only REITs rather than the panel VARs used in columns (1)-(6) that are based
on the geographical location of REIT properties. We compute the short selling activity measures
for Apartments-only REITs (i.e., those with PTYPE=8 and PSUB=2) and determiner whether
they can forecast the Moody’s/RCA Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI) for apartments.
The CPPI data are weighted, repeat-sales indices, which are computed using contemporaneous
transaction-price-based data on private deals.19 The CPPI tracks specifically apartment prop-
erties, providing an alternative benchmark from which to track housing prices. In our sample,
there is an average of 11.9 Apartments-only REITs. Results in column (9) show that all short
selling measures can successfully forecast the apartments CPPI. For example, using utiliza-
19There are also specific CPPIs for commercial, industrial, office and the aggregate U.S. series, which are
available at a monthly frequency. We use only data on apartments since the focus of our paper is on housing
markets).
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tion (U) as the measure of short selling activity yields a negative and significant coefficient of
−0.018. We find equivalent results when using On Loan and Short Interest Ratio as measures
of short selling activity. Overall, we can conclude that there is a negative relationship between
short selling measures and future stock returns in line with Hypothesis 2.
Another useful output of VAR models is the ability to estimate the reaction of a particular
endogenous variable to a shock in another endogenous variable. Because of the likely corre-
lation among shocks to endogenous variables, we must make an identifying assumption to be
able to orthogonalize the residuals. We use variables that appear earlier in the vector z because,
in the short-run, they are deemed “more exogenous” than latter ones.20
Figure 2 displays impulse-response graphs with the response of house price returns over
twelve months, given a one standard deviation shock to alternative short sales proxies. We also
report 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 500 simulations. These results confirm
the findings from our panel VAR analysis: a shock to short selling measures leads to a decrease
in house price returns in the next month. For example, a one standard deviation shock to the
short interest ratio is associated with a -0.076% decrease in house prices the next month, which
is equivalent to a 0.11 standard deviation change in house prices. These shocks are also very
persistent, with lower returns still present even six months after the initial shock. The same
standard deviation shock to short selling On Loan yields a similar change in house prices. In
Panels A and C, we observe that the impact of shocks is statistically significant at least up to
10 months after the shock. Panel B (Short Interest Ratio) shows that the effect is statistically
significant only in the first four months after the shock.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
20Our results are unaffected by the ordering in which variables enter the system.
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We also perform a variance decomposition analysis in Figure 3. Each panel shows the
fraction of the FHFA index returns’ residuals variance over a 12-month period that can be
explained by exogenous shocks to each measure of short selling activity and to REIT returns
indices. For example, Panel A shows that 43.3% of the 12-month residual variability in RFHFAt
can be explained by shocks to On Loan and only 4.7% are due to shocks to RREITt . The
explained fraction of forecasting residuals’ variance for Short Interest Ratio and Utilization
is lower but still large (20% and 39%, respectively). This analysis highlights the usefulness
of proxies for measures of REIT short selling to forecast changes in house prices above and
beyond the information contained in the dynamics of REIT returns.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Overall, these results show that the three measures of short selling (i.e., Utilization, On
Loan, and Short Interest Ratio) can forecast house prices. The findings highlight the advantages
of using our proxies for short selling intensity computed from equity lending data. These results
are strongly significant for the prediction of both the FHFA and the apartments CPPI . Overall,
we find evidence that the returns of real assets (i.e., housing) can be predicted by the behavior
of lagged characteristics of financial securities (i.e., short selling intensity of REITs), in line
with Hypothesis 2.
Geographical Cross-Section of Short Selling Activity and House Price Pre-
dictability
In this subsection we study the geographical cross-section of REIT short selling activity ac-
cording to the physical location of REIT real estate assets. First, we investigate the predictability
of housing returns, REREt , for the four main U.S. census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South,
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and West. Table 7 exhibits the results of this test using standard VARs for each U.S. Census
Region, with 82 observations per region. We find that an increase in Utilization (U) forecasts
a statistically significant decrease in house prices (i.e., FHFA house price index returns) in the
Midwest, South and West regions. It forecasts a negative non-significant decrease in the North-
east region. Similar results obtain when we use On Loan (OL), but are somewhat weaker for
the Short Interest Ratio (SIR). This outcome highlights the advantage of measuring short selling
activity with data from the equity lending market rather than with the standard short interest
data used in the literature. This table also shows that these measures of short selling activity
present a positive and significant autocorrelation.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Investors attempt to hedge or speculate on lower house prices by establishing short positions
on REIT stocks. We therefore expect to find a stronger link between the short selling activity
of REITs with properties located in areas with larger house price run-ups and future housing
returns in those areas (Hypothesis 3). Using hand-collected data on REIT property holdings, we
classify each REIT as belonging to one of the following regional categories (DLOCi ): Boom, No
Boom, and Diversified.21 We then compute short selling activity for REITs with the majority of
their properties in each of these three regions.22 We use returns of the No Boom regions as our
benchmark and estimate a panel regression of next-period housing returns in a particular area
i, RREi,t , as a function of measures of short selling intensity (SS) for that particular area plus
control variables (x) and monthly fixed-effects. We adapt the main specification in equation
(6) to test Hypothesis 3 by adding an interaction term between past short selling activity and
21REITs that invest in mortgages are not included in our tests.
22For Diversified REITs, we use returns of the nationwide aggregate US house price index as the dependent
variable.
29
location, SSi,t−1 ·DLOCi :
RREi,t = Γ0 + Γ1 · SSi,t−1 + Γ2 · SSi,t−1 ·DLOCi + Γ3 ·DLOCi + Γ4′xt−1 + i,t. (7)
Table 8 displays the tests of Hypothesis 3 using this panel regression. In columns (1)-(3),
we show results using data for all types of REITs (e.g., residential, hotels, offices, etc.) to
construct short sales measures for each area. In columns (4)-(6), we use only those REITs
investing in residential properties (i.e. with variable PTY PE in the CRSP-Ziman database
being equal to 8), in a similar approach to the one used in Table 6). Because No Boom is our
benchmark group for this analysis, we expect the vector of coefficients Γ3 of the interaction
between past short selling activity and location, xi,t−1 · DLOCi , to be negative.23 We find that
the impact of short selling activity on housing returns varies within our groups. While there
is no explanatory power for the benchmark No Boom area (i.e., the SS Variable coefficient is
not significant), we find negative and significant coefficients for the SS Variable * D(Boom) and
SS Variable * D(Diversified). For example, from column (4), a one standard deviation increase
in Utilization leads to a 0.23% (=-0.028*8.05%) decrease in FHFA House Price Index returns
in the following month. This is economically significant and corresponds to a 0.32 standard
deviation decrease in house price returns.24 This result is one of the key contributions of our
paper. It shows that an increase in Utilization of REITs forecasts declines in house prices in
areas that experienced a housing boom, but not for those areas that did not present a housing
boom. The predictive power of Utilization in column (6) for REITs with properties located
in Boom areas is significantly stronger than the predictability for REITs with properties in No
Boom areas.
23Our results hold when we move the beginning of a set of “bust” months (i.e., No Boom months) one or two
months forward.
24The mean return of the FHFA index is -0.11% with a standard deviation of 0.70%.
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[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Altogether, these results support our hypothesis that measures of short selling derived from
residential REITs, in particular Utilization and Short Interest Ratio, can forecast future house
prices. Furthermore, there is an important asymmetric component in this relationship, with
house prices reacting differently depending on the areas in which the underlying properties of
the REITs are located. As a result, we find consistent house price predictability in line with
our hypothesis for REITs with properties located in areas that had experienced a housing boom
prior to our sample period.
Trading Strategy
Finally, we study the implementation of a trading strategy to hedge against house prices
decreases, or to speculate on their fall, that arises from our previous analysis. Hypothesis 2
predicts that an increase in REITs’ short selling activity forecasts a reduction in next month’s
housing returns. The trading strategy goes as follows: An investor who is long in housing should
short REITs with properties located in the same region when she observes that the short selling
activity of REITs is above a certain threshold relative to its historical mean. In practical terms,
we create an indicator variable, D(High SS Variable), equal to 1 if the short selling activity of
diversified U.S. REITs is at least 1.64 standard deviations above its historical mean, and equal
to 0 otherwise.25 To facilitate the implementation of the strategy and use the same entry and exit
points across all regions, we compute this indicator variable using the diversified REITs defined
in Section 4.
Table 9 shows that the D(High SS Variable) variable can forecast next month’s FHFA ag-
25Results are also robust to using two standard deviations above the mean. Notice that 1.64 standard deviation
times above its mean is equivalent to the 95 percentile of the distribution.
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gregate housing prices, for both proxies for short selling intensity computed from REIT’s stock
lending data. Column [1] shows that whenever the measure of short selling Utilization, Ut, is
1.64 standard deviation times above its mean, then FHFA returns decrease an overage of 0.385%
in the subsequent month. In column [2] this coefficient is also negative and significant when
using On Loan (OLt). In columns [3]-[4], we also find similar results when using a 12-month
rolling window to compute the dummy and avoid look-ahead biases. Since On Loan is the
most reliable and quickest to obtain measure of short selling activity, let us focus on the result
that arises from column [4]: when On Loan is 1.64 standard deviations above its mean using a
12-month rolling window, then FHFA returns decrease an average of 0.607% in the next month.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
While the results above show that short sales intensity can forecast prices in the subsequent
month, investors are unable to directly short the FHFA index. Instead, we examine the perfor-
mance of a trading strategy that is long the FHFA housing index, but that also incorporates a
short position in REITs. The example provides evidence that we can successfully use REITs to
hedge against housing price declines to improve investors returns during the 2006-2013 period.
Figure 4 exhibits the performance of a trading strategy that is long the FHFA House Price
Index but uses REITs to short 50% value of the long position whenever the D(High SS Variable)
indicator variable, measured using On Loan, is equal to one. All the plots show the out-of-
sample performance of the hedging strategy (dashed line) compared to the FHFA House Price
Index (solid line). They are all normalized to $100 in June 2007. Panel A shows the performance
of the hedging strategy using individual U.S. Census FHFA Housing Price Indices on the long
leg and using region-specific REITs on the short side of the strategy. These results show the
success of the hedging ability of this strategy in regions that experienced large house price run-
ups during the years prior to 2007, i.e., Northeast and West. Its performance is satisfactory
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for the South and absent for the Midwest, where we observed a smaller house price run-up
in the same period. Panel B shows similar results when we examine the performance using
diversified REIT to hedge against price decreases in the aggregate FHFA index. We obtain
similar results when we use Utilization as a measure of short selling intensity. For example,
the excess performance of the hedging strategy with respect to the respective FHFA index using
Utilization is 20.1% and 7.6% in the Northeast and West, respectively. The equivalent excess
performance when using On Loan are 28.6% and 17.8% (see Figure 4). For the aggregate U.S.
Housing Price Index, the excess performance is 1.9% for Utilization and 9.3%.for On Loan.
This example reinforces the usefulness of using short selling intensity to hedge against housing
price decreases.
We note that this strategy is unlikely to be used by retail investors given the cost of short sell-
ing, which include not only equity lending costs but also collateral and margin requirements.
While the equity lending costs are not large, short sellers face collateral and margin require-
ments that can make the strategy unfeasible for retail investors. For instance, under Regulation
T, the Federal Reserve Board requires that short sales accounts have at least 150% of the value
of the short sale at the beginning of the trade.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
Conclusion
This paper investigates ways in which investors can use financial securities to bet on price
decreases of real assets that face high transaction costs and short sales constraints. More specif-
ically, we study the way in which Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) can be used to hedge
the downside risk of housing markets or speculate on the decrease of house prices.
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We construct a dataset of REIT equity lending activity and FHFA index returns, both pre-
sented monthly between July 2006 through July 2013. We use the link between U.S. house
prices and REITs with a panel VAR (PVAR) approach to test whether short selling activity has
forecasting ability to explain the next month’s house prices, taking into account the variation
among housing cycles and across geographical areas. Our main findings are as follows. First,
the correlation between REIT returns and FHFA housing returns is significantly positive only
during housing downturns. Second, an increase in short selling activity forecasts decreases in
house prices in the following month. Third, this negative correlation is greater in areas that have
just experienced a housing boom than in those without a boom. We find that a one standard de-
viation increase in the fraction of shares on loan of REITs with properties in housing boom
areas (e.g., the West region in the U.S.) forecasts a 0.52% (0.74 standard deviations) decrease
in house prices in the following month. We do not find any effect in REITs with properties
no housing boom areas (e.g., the Midwest region in the U.S.) Our results account for simul-
taneous determination and area-level heterogeneity between short selling activity, REITs stock
returns, and house prices. We also implement a hedging strategy based on short selling intensity
of REITs to reduce the downside of housing price decreases, showing that investors can limit
potential losses by short selling REITs.
These results show the usefulness of financial data in forecasting changes in real asset prices
and how specific geographical areas were affected differently by short selling activity during
the financial crisis in 2008-2009. In particular, the demand for shorting REITs captured by
the fraction of market capitalization on loan can help to forecast future house prices, with an
important asymmetric component depending on the location of the underlying properties of the
REITs. Short selling can be a useful tool for market participants to hedge against future price
decreases. Regulators can track measures from the equity lending market to improve forecasts
of house prices and implement policies to prevent real estate bubbles. Furthermore, imposing
34
short selling constraints on stocks like REITs – which invest in assets subject to high transaction
costs – matters for price efficiency and the dissemination of information.
35
Acknowledgements
We thank Tom Davidoff, Thierry Foucault, Paolo Fulghieri, Nicolae Garleanu, David Gelt-
ner, Dwight Jaffee, Pedro Matos, Marc Lipson, Tano Santos, Todd Sinai, Richard Stanton,
Eva Steiner, Michela Verardo, Nancy Wallace, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and the participants at
the ASSA/AREUEA Meetings and the AEFIN Finance Forum for their helpful discussions and
suggestions. We are grateful to Filipa Figueiredo and Elie El Khoury for excellent research
assistantship. We are thankful to Real Capital Analytics for providing us with the Commer-
cial Property Price Index (CPPI) data. We also thank Inessa Love for making the panel VAR
routines used in Love and Zicchino (2006)) available to researchers. Saffi acknowledges the fi-
nancial support provided by the Cambridge Endownment for Research in Finance (CERF) and
Vergara-Alert the support of the Public-Private Sector Research Center at IESE, the Spanish
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Ref. ECO2015-63711-P), and AGAUR (Project ref:
2014-SGR-1496).
36
References
Abrigo, M. R., and I. Love. 2016. Estimation of Panel Vector Autoregression in Stata: a
Package of Programs. Working Paper, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of
Economics.
Ang, A., G. Bekaert, and M. Wei. 2007. Do Macro Variables, Asset markets, or Surveys
Forecast Inflation Better? Journal of Monetary Economics 54:1163–1212.
Arnold, T., A. Butler, T. Crack, and Y. Zhang. 2005. The Information Content of Short Interest:
A Natural Experiment. Journal of Business 78:1307–1336.
Asquith, P., and L. Meulbroek. 1995. An Empirical Investigation of Short Interest. Working
Paper, Harvard Business School.
Bailey, W., and K. C. Chan. 1993. Macroeconomic Influences and the Variability of the Com-
modity Futures Basis. Journal of Finance 48:555–573.
Barkham, R., and D. Geltner. 1995. Price Discovery in American and British Property Mar-
kets. Real Estate Economics 23:21–44.
Benjamin, J., S. Sirmans, and E. Zietz. 2001. Returns and Risk on Real Estate and Other
Investments: More Evidence. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 7:183–214.
Blau, B., M. Hill, and H. Wang. 2011. REIT Short Sales and Return Predictability. Journal of
Real Estate Finance and Economics 42:481–503.
Boehme, R., B. R. Danielsen, and S. M. Sorescu. 2006. Short-sale Constraints, Dispersion of
Opinion and Overvaluation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41:455–487.
Boehmer, E., Z. R. Husza´r, and B. D. Jordan. 2010. The Good News in Short Interest. Journal
of Financial Economics 96:80–97.
Boudry, W. I., N. E. Coulson, J. G. Kallberg, and C. H. Liu. 2012. On the Hybrid Nature of
REITs. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 44:230–249.
Campbell, S. D., M. A. Davis, J. Gallin, and R. F. Martin. 2009. What Moves Housing Mar-
37
kets: A Variance Decomposition of the Rent–Price Ratio. Journal of Urban Economics
66:90–102.
Chen, H., D. Downs, and G. Patterson. 2012. The Information Content of REIT Short Interest:
Investment Focus and Heterogeneous Beliefs. Real Estate Economics 40:249–283.
Chen, H., and V. Singal. 2003. Role of Speculative Short Sales in Price Formation: the Case
of the Weekend Effect. Journal of Finance 58:685–706.
Choi, I. 2001. Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. Journal of International Money and Finance
20:249–272.
Christoffersen, S. E. K., C. C. Geczy, and D. K. Musto. 2005. Crossborder Dividend Taxation
and the Preference of Taxable and Non-taxable Investors: Evidence from Canada. Journal
of Financial Economics 78:121–144.
Clayton, J., and G. MacKinnon. 2001. The Time-varying Nature of the Link Between REIT,
Real Estate and Financial Asset Returns. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management
7:43–54.
Cohen, L., K. B. Diether, and C. J. Malloy. 2007. Supply and Demand Shifts in the Shorting
Market. Journal of Finance 62:2061–2096.
Corradin, S., J. Fillat, and C. Vergara-Alert. 2014. Optimal Portfolio Choice with Predictability
in House Prices and Transaction Costs. Review of Financial Studies 27:823–880.
Dechow, P., A. Hutton, L. Meulbroek, and R. Sloan. 2001. Short-sellers, Fundamental Analy-
sis, and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 61:77–106.
Desai, H., K. Ramesh, S. Thiagarajan, and B. Balachandran. 2002. An Investigation of the
Informational Role of Short Interest in the Nasdaq Market. Journal of Finance 57:2263–
2287.
Geltner, D. 1998. How Accurate is the NCREIF Index as a Benchmark, and Who Cares? Real
Estate Finance 14:25–37.
38
Geltner, D., N. G. Miller, J. Clayton, and P. Eichholtz. 2001. Commercial Real Estate Analysis
and Investments, vol. 1. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.
Ghysels, E., A. Plazzi, W. N. Torous, and R. I. Valkanov. 2012. Forecasting Real Estate Prices.
Handbook of Economic Forecasting 2.
Green, R. K. 1997. Follow the Leader: How Changes in Residential and Non-Residential
Investment Predict Changes in GDP. Real Estate Economics 25:253–270.
Gyourko, J. 2009. Understanding Commercial Real Estate: How Different from Housing Is
It? Journal of Portfolio Management 35:23–37.
Gyourko, J., and D. B. Keim. 1992. What Does the Stock Market Tell Us about Real Estate
Returns? Real Estate Economics 20:457–485.
Hoesli, M., and E. Oikarinen. 2012. Are REITs Real Estate? Evidence from International
Sector Level Data. Journal of International Money and Finance 31:1823–1850.
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H. S. Rosen. 1988. Estimating Vector Autoregressions with
Panel Data. Econometrica 56:1371–95.
Husza´r, Z. R., R. S. Tan, and W. Zhang. 2017. Do Short Sellers Exploit Industry Information?
Journal of Empirical Finance 41:118–139.
Jones, C. M., and O. A. Lamont. 2002. Short-sale Constraints and Stock Returns. Journal of
Financial Economics 66:207–239.
Koijen, R. S., O. Van Hemert, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh. 2009. Mortgage Timing. Journal of
Financial Economics 93:292–324.
Kyle, A. 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica 53:1315–1335.
Lee, M.-L., M.-T. Lee, and K. C. Chiang. 2008. Real Estate Risk Exposure of Equity Real
Estate Investment Trusts. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 36:165.
Lewis, M. 2010. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. New York, NY : W. W.
Norton & Company.
39
Li, D. D., and K. Yung. 2004. Short Interest in Real Estate Investment Trusts. International
Real Estate Review 7:56–70.
Liew, J., and M. Vassalou. 2000. Can Book-to-Market, Size and Momentum Be Risk Factors
that Predict Economic Growth? Journal of Financial Economics 57:221–245.
Love, I., and L. Zicchino. 2006. Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior:
Evidence from Panel VAR. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46:190–210.
Morawski, J., H. Rehkugler, and R. Fu¨ss. 2008. The Nature of Listed Real Estate Companies:
Property or Equity Market? Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 22:101.
Nagel, S. 2005. Short Sales, Institutional Investors and the Cross-section of Stock Returns.
Journal of Financial Economics 78:277–309.
Naranjo, A., and D. C. Ling. 1997. Economic Risk Factors and Commercial Real Estate
Returns. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 14:283–307.
Oikarinen, E., M. Hoesli, and C. Serrano. 2011. The Long-run Dynamics between Direct and
Securitized Real Estate. Journal of Real Estate Research 33:73–103.
Pagliari, J. L., K. A. Scherer, and R. T. Monopoli. 2005. Public Versus Private Real Estate
Equities: A More Refined, Long-term Comparison. Real Estate Economics 33:147–187.
Pesaran, M. H., and R. Smith. 1995. Estimating Long-run Relationships from Dynamic Het-
erogeneous Panels. Journal of Econometrics 68:79–113.
Porras Prado, M., P. A. C. Saffi, and J. Sturgess. 2016. Ownership Structure, Limits to Arbi-
trage, and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending Markets. Review of Financial
Studies 29:3211–3244.
Quan, D. C., and S. Titman. 1999. Do Real Estate Prices and Stock Prices Move Together?
An International Analysis. Real Estate Economics 27:183–207.
Rapach, D. E., M. C. Ringgenberg, and G. Zhou. 2016. Short Interest and Aggregate Stock
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 121:46–65.
40
Riddiough, T. J., M. Moriarty, and P. Yeatman. 2005. Privately Versus Publicly Held Asset
Investment Performance. Real Estate Economics 33:121–146.
Saffi, P. A. C., and K. Sigurdsson. 2011. Price Efficiency and Short Selling. Review of
Financial Studies 24:821–852.
Spiegel, M. 2001. Housing Return and Construction Cycles. Real Estate Economics 29:521–
551.
Sun, J., X. Yang, and X. Zhao. 2012. Understanding Commercial Real Estate Indices. Journal
of Real Estate Portfolio Management 18:289–303.
Yunus, N., J. A. Hansz, and P. J. Kennedy. 2012. Dynamic Interactions Between Private and
Public Real Estate Markets: Some International Evidence. Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics 45:1021–1040.
41
Ta
bl
e
1.
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
to
th
e
L
ite
ra
tu
re
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
su
m
m
ar
iz
es
th
e
em
pi
ri
ca
ls
tr
at
eg
ie
s
us
ed
in
th
e
lit
er
at
ur
e
th
at
st
ud
ie
s
ho
w
th
e
sh
or
ts
el
lin
g
ac
tiv
ity
of
st
oc
ks
an
d
R
E
IT
s
pr
ed
ic
ts
re
tu
rn
s
–
(r
ow
s
(1
)
an
d
(2
),
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y)
–
an
d
th
e
lit
er
at
ur
e
th
at
an
al
yz
es
ho
w
ag
gr
eg
at
e
R
E
IT
s
re
tu
rn
s
fo
re
ca
st
s
re
al
es
ta
te
pr
ic
es
–
(r
ow
(3
))
–.
It
al
so
co
m
pa
re
s
th
es
e
em
pi
ri
ca
ls
tr
at
eg
ie
s
to
th
e
on
e
in
ou
rp
ap
er
(r
ow
(4
))
.
M
ai
n
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
D
ep
en
de
nt
L
ev
el
of
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l
Pa
pe
rs
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
A
na
ly
si
s
L
ev
el
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n
(1
)
Sh
or
ts
el
lin
g
ac
tiv
ity
St
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
In
di
vi
du
al
U
.S
.a
gg
re
ga
te
—
A
sq
ui
th
an
d
M
eu
lb
ro
ek
(1
99
5)
;J
on
es
an
d
L
am
on
t
of
st
oc
ks
st
oc
ks
(2
00
2)
;D
es
ai
et
al
.(
20
02
);
B
oe
hm
e,
D
an
ie
ls
en
,
(U
su
al
ly
sh
or
ti
nt
er
es
t)
an
d
So
re
sc
u
(2
00
6)
;C
oh
en
,D
ie
th
er
,a
nd
M
al
lo
y
(2
00
7)
;N
ag
el
(2
00
5)
;B
oe
hm
er
,H
us
za
r,
an
d
Jo
rd
an
(2
01
0)
;R
ap
ac
h,
R
in
gg
en
be
rg
,a
nd
Z
ho
u
(2
01
6)
;a
nd
H
us
za
r,
Ta
n,
an
d
Z
ha
ng
(2
01
7)
(2
)
Sh
or
ts
el
lin
g
ac
tiv
ity
St
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
In
di
vi
du
al
U
.S
.a
gg
re
ga
te
N
o
L
ia
nd
Y
un
g
(2
00
4)
;B
la
u,
H
ill
,a
nd
W
an
g
(2
01
1)
;a
nd
of
R
E
IT
s
st
oc
ks
C
he
n,
D
ow
ns
,a
nd
Pa
tte
rs
on
(2
01
2)
.
(O
nl
y
sh
or
ti
nt
er
es
t)
(3
)
A
gg
re
ga
te
R
E
IT
s
R
ea
le
st
at
e
pr
ic
es
Po
rt
fo
lio
U
.S
.a
gg
re
ga
te
N
o
G
yo
ur
ko
an
d
K
ei
m
(1
99
2)
;B
ar
kh
am
an
d
G
el
tn
er
re
tu
rn
s
(A
pp
ra
is
al
s:
(1
99
5)
;N
ar
an
jo
an
d
L
in
g
(1
99
7)
;B
en
ja
m
in
,S
ir
m
an
s,
N
C
R
E
IF
)
an
d
Z
ie
tz
(2
00
1)
;P
ag
lia
ri
,S
ch
er
er
,a
nd
M
on
op
ol
i
(2
00
5)
;a
nd
R
id
di
ou
gh
,M
or
ia
rt
y
an
d
Y
ea
tm
an
(2
00
5)
(4
)
Sh
or
ts
el
lin
g
ac
tiv
ity
H
ou
se
pr
ic
es
In
di
vi
du
al
U
.S
.a
gg
re
ga
te
Y
es
O
ur
pa
pe
r
of
R
E
IT
s
(R
ea
lt
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
:
R
E
IT
s
U
.S
.r
eg
io
na
l
(B
ot
h
sh
or
ti
nt
er
es
t
FH
FA
)
U
.S
.p
ro
pe
rt
y
ty
pe
s
an
d
eq
ui
ty
le
nd
in
g)
42
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics of monthly data from July 2006 through July 2013. Market Cap is the average
REIT size in the sample in millions of US dollars. Ret(Individual REIT) is the average monthly return of individual
REITs. Avg. Bid-Ask Spread is the average bid-ask spread at the close of the market. Avg. Daily Turnover is the
average daily turnover as a fraction of market capitalization. Supply is the value of stocks available to borrow,
scaled by market capitalization. On Loan is the value of shares lent out, scaled by market capitalization. Short
Interest Ratio is defined as the value of shorted shares reported in Compustat ,scaled by market capitalization.
Utilization is On Loan divided by Supply. RFHFA is the monthly change in the FHFA Index. RCPPI is the
monthly change in the apartments CPPI. RREIT is the mean return of the CRSP-Ziman REIT Index. Finally,
10y T-bond Yield is the constant maturity yield of Treasury bonds and Term Spread is the difference between the
10-year and the 3-month T-Bond yields.
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
Number of REITs 84 114.13 113.00 7.65 103.00 138.00 1.48 5.26
Market Cap (USD mil.) 84 5,128 3,560 4,034 778 19,489 1.40 4.47
Ret(Individual REIT) 84 0.99% 1.50% 7.86% -30.21% 39.93% 0.03 7.77
Avg. Bid-Ask Spread (%) 84 0.14% 0.09% 0.14% 0.03% 1.14% 2.84 14.19
Avg. Daily Turnover 84 0.28% 0.23% 0.15% 0.09% 1.04% 1.84 7.10
Supply (%) 84 29.00% 30.28% 6.58% 13.35% 40.44% -0.73 2.79
On Loan (%) 84 6.41% 6.07% 3.10% 1.23% 15.21% 0.58 2.60
Utilization (%) 84 18.62% 17.57% 8.05% 5.23% 44.17% 0.41 2.41
Short Interest Ratio (%) 84 3.25% 2.85% 1.89% 0.15% 10.64% 1.15 4.15
RFHFA 84 -0.11% -0.03% 0.70% -2.02% 1.75% -0.02 2.56
RCPPI 84 0.13% 0.73% 1.58% -4.22% 3.07% -1.17 3.48
RREIT 84 0.64% 1.10% 7.82% -30.21% 27.88% -0.71 6.82
10y T-bond Yield 84 3.22% 3.32% 1.01% 1.51% 5.03% -0.02 1.92
Term Spread (10y - 3m) 84 1.98% 2.15% 1.22% -0.60% 3.79% -0.67 2.45
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Table 3. Short Selling Measures per Geographical Location of REITs Properties
This table shows the average and the standard deviation of short selling measures according to the geographical
location of REITs properties using data from July 2006 through July 2013. Panel A shows these statistics for
REITs in each U.S. Census region. If more than 50% of the properties of a REIT are located in one of the four
U.S. Census regions, Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, then it is classified as being part of that specific region
group. If there is no region containing more than 50% of the REIT’s properties but the REIT has more than 50% of
its properties in a combination of two regions, then we create a group for the specific combination of two regions.
Only the pairs Northeast+South, Northeast+West, Midwest+South, and South+West have at least one REIT. In
total, we have eight regional groups. If the REIT has properties spanning different regions but no combination
of two regions accounting for more than 50% of the REIT’s properties, then the REIT is classified as Diversified.
Panel B shows the summary statistics grouped by areas that have experienced a relative price boom in their housing
markets (Housing Boom areas), defined as areas in which house prices had a cumulative run-up equal to or greater
than 75% during the January 2000 - December 2007 period, and areas that have not experienced such an increase
(No Housing Boom areas). No. REITs is the number of REITs in each group. Supply is the value of stocks
available to borrow, scaled by market capitalization. On Loan is the value of shares lent out, scaled by market
capitalization. Short Interest Ratio (SIR) is defined as the value of shorted shares reported in Compustat, scaled by
market capitalization. Utilization is On Loan divided by Supply.
Panel A. By U.S. Census Regions
Geographical Location No. Supply On Loan SIR Utilization
of the REITs Properties REITs (%) (%) (%) (%)
Northeast (N) Mean 4.04 35.29 8.08 2.27 18.74
St.Dev. 0.19 3.59 2.88 1.07 7.01
Midwest (M) Mean 1.00 18.17 2.81 0.03 13.31
St.Dev. 0.00 3.58 1.28 0.27 6.91
South (S) Mean 13.24 29.31 7.42 3.49 22.59
St.Dev. 1.46 2.57 2.28 1.22 7.86
West (W) Mean 4.93 35.38 10.29 5.00 23.84
St.Dev. 0.40 3.52 4.28 3.21 9.48
N+S Mean 1.00 33.93 10.12 9.20 23.70
St.Dev. 0.00 4.96 6.81 4.96 14.89
N+W Mean 2.06 31.32 4.31 0.92 11.71
St.Dev. 0.24 4.51 1.99 1.63 6.66
M+S Mean 6.62 29.48 5.98 0.71 17.74
St.Dev. 0.79 2.98 2.02 0.36 5.79
S+W Mean 11.27 29.47 5.23 3.70 15.62
St.Dev. 0.76 3.25 2.55 1.75 7.45
Diversified Mean 62.30 31.18 7.71 6.83 19.35
St.Dev. 5.63 3.80 2.56 2.32 5.15
Panel B. By Boom vs. No Boom
Geographical Location No. Supply On Loan SIR Utilization
of the REITs Properties REITs (%) (%) (%) (%)
No Housing Boom Areas Mean 25.39 28.36 7.44 6.85 23.63
St.Dev. 2.30 3.16 1.98 1.83 5.68
Housing Boom Areas Mean 12.21 35.22 10.30 8.75 24.68
St.Dev. 0.87 3.60 2.93 3.08 6.53
Diversified Mean 62.30 31.18 7.71 6.83 19.35
St.Dev. 5.63 3.80 2.56 2.32 5.15
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Table 4. Test of Hypothesis 1. Conditional Correlations between REIT and Housing Returns
Panel A displays the correlation between the returns of the FHFA House Price Index, RFHFA, and the returns
of the aggregate portfolio of REITs, RREIT , according to the geographical location of the majority of REITs
properties (i.e., the U.S. Census regions Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, and the U.S. Aggregate) and split
by housing market cycles. Column (1) uses data from February 1991 through December 2013, column (2) includes
periods of no downturns in the housing markets (i.e., No Bust periods), and column (3) only includes the periods
of housing downturns (i.e., Bust periods). Bust periods are defined as months in which the FHFA House Price
Index is 1.64 standard deviations below the rolling average from 1990 up through a given month. The remaining
months are classified as No Bust Periods. Panel B displays, for each U.S. Census region and for the pooled sample,
the results of regressing RFHFA on RREIT , an indicator variable (Bust Dummy) equal to one for Bust periods
months, and the interaction term RREIT × Bust Dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A. Conditional correlations between RFHFA and RREIT
All periods No bust Bust
(Full sample) periods periods
(1) (2) (3)
Northeast (N) 0.0148 -0.0003 0.2996
Midwest (M) 0.0184 0.0697 0.0830
South (S) 0.0318 -0.0497 0.0672
West (W) 0.1307 -0.1301 0.2172
All Regions 0.0578 -0.0356 0.2075
Panel B. Conditional Regressions of RFHFA on RREIT by Geographical Regions
RREIT Bust RREIT × Intercept Adj. R2 Obs.
Region (%) Dummy Bust Dummy
Northeast (N) -0.0094 0.0004 0.0285 0.0030*** 0.010 270
[0.0107] [0.0010] [0.0223] [0.0006]
Midwest (M) -0.0268*** -0.0005 0.0566*** 0.0034*** 0.066 270
[0.0102] [0.0008] [0.01912] [0.0005]
South (S) -0.0295*** -0.0001 0.0693*** 0.0038*** 0.086 270
[0.0078] [0.0007] [0.0191] [0.0004]
West (W) -0.0313*** -0.0009 0.1052*** 0.0048*** 0.087 270
[0.0116] [0.0014] [0.0209] [0.0007]
All Regions -0.0243*** -0.0003 0.0649*** 0.0038*** 0.051 1,080
[0.0052] [0.0005] [0.0110] [0.0003]
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Table 5. Panel Vector Autoregressions: Unit Root Tests and Lag Selection
Panel A presents panel data unit root tests of short selling measures activity using the Fischer-type test as in Choi
(2001)). We use the following measures of short selling activity: On Loan, Short Interest Ratio, and Utilization.
All tests are based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller using two lags, include a drift term, and subtract cross-section
averages for each panel. We report test statistics and associated p-values for the null hypothesis that all panels
contain a unit root for a particular variable. Panel B reports values for the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) for up to four lags for
the system comprised by On Loan, RREITs, and RFHFA.
Panel A. Panel Data Unit Root Test
H0: All panels contain unit root
Variable Z-stat p-value
Utilization -3.70 0.000
On Loan -2.64 0.004
Short Interest Ratio -3.36 0.000
Number of Panels (N) 3
Number of Periods (T) 85
Panel B. Information Criteria for Alternative Lags of On Loan
Lag BIC AIC HQIC
1 -156.53 -33.55 -83.19
2 -123.38 -31.14 -68.37
3 -82.85 -21.36 -46.17
4 -42.32 -11.57 -23.98
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Table 9. Trading Strategy. Rationale and Efficiency
The table displays results of OLS regressions of the aggregate U.S. FHFA House Price Index next period’s return
on an indicator variable for high short selling intensity,D(High SS V ariable), from July 2006 through July 2013.
D(High SS Variable) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the short selling measure of diversified U.S. REITs’ in
a given month is 1.64 standard deviations above the sample mean (columns [1] and [2]) or above the previous
12-month’s rolling-window mean (columns [3] and [4]). SS Variable denotes the short selling measure employed:
Utilization (Ut), defined as the number of shares on loan divided by the number of shares available to borrow;
and On Loan (OLt), defined as the value of shares lent out, scaled by market capitalization. RREITt−1 is the lagged
return of the CRSP-Ziman REIT index. Bid-Ask Spread is the average monthly bid-ask spread at the close of
the market. Ln(Turnover) is the log of daily turnover scaled by market capitalization. All regressions include the
bid-ask spread, turnover, and the term spread as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
REITs’ Set: All sample 12-month rolling window
SS Variable: Ut OLt Ut OLt
[1] [2] [3] [4]
D(High SS Variable) -0.385* -0.424*** -0.540*** -0.607***
[0.222] [0.148] [0.188] [0.203]
Lag Ret(REIT) 0.017* 0.013 0.011 0.010
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009]
Bid-Ask Spread (%) -1.012 -1.049* -2.030*** -1.608**
[0.614] [0.580] [0.662] [0.670]
Ln(Turnover) 0.152 0.127 0.358* 0.285
[0.172] [0.157] [0.186] [0.175]
Term Spread (10y-3m) -0.066 -0.062 -0.255*** -0.291***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.092] [0.104]
Lag Ret(FHFA) 0.501*** 0.458*** 0.417*** 0.396***
[0.113] [0.112] [0.126] [0.128]
Obs. 84 84 72 72
Adj. R2 0.404 0.422 0.448 0.466
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Figure 1. REITs’ Short Selling Activity, Housing Returns and the Geographical Location of REIT Properties
This figure plots measures of the average equity lending activity (Supply and On Loan) of REITs with more than
50% of their properties located in one of the U.S. Census regions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).
We compare these measures to the FHFA House Price Index. Supply is the amount available to borrow, scaled by
market capitalization. On Loan is the number of shares effectively lent out, scaled by total shares outstanding. The
left side of the vertical axis shows the scale for the house price index (1.0 = January 2000). The right side of the
vertical axis shows the scale for Supply and On Loan. Short selling measures are available only from July 2006
through July 2013.
Panel A. Geographical location by U.S. Census regions
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Panel B. Geographical Location by Areas that Experienced a Housing Boom or No Boom
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Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions of Housing Returns
The figure plots the values (in percentage points) of the impulse-response (IR) function for the panel VAR estimated
in columns (1)-(3) of Table 6 given a one standard deviation shock to short selling measures. Each panel unit in
the panel VAR corresponds to one of three categories: Boom (No Boom) is defined as U.S. Census regions in
which house prices had a cumulative run-up equal to or greater than (less than) 75% from January 2000 through
December 2007, and Diversified is the the U.S. as whole. We consider three measures of short selling activity:
Utilization is the number of shares on loan divided by the number of shares available to borrow (Panel A), On
Loan is the number of shares effectively lent out, scaled by total shares outstanding (Panel B), and Short Interest
Ratio is the value of shorted shares reported in Compustat, scaled by market capitalization (Panel C). We use the
population-weighted FHFA House Price Index for each region as a measure of house prices to compute housing
returns for Boom and No Boom; For the Diversified category we use the aggregate U.S. FHFA index. Dotted red
lines correspond to 5% and 95% confidence intervals calculated over 500 bootstrapped simulations.
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Figure 3. Variance Decomposition
This figure shows variance decompositions of the housing returns following shocks to short selling measure and
Ret(REITs) based on the panel VAR estimated in columns (1)-(3) of Table 6. Each panel unit in the panel VAR
corresponds to one of three categories: Boom (No Boom) is defined as U.S. Census regions in which house prices
had a cumulative run-up equal to or greater than (less than) 75% from January 2000 through December 2007,
and Diversified is the the U.S. as a whole. We consider three measures of short selling activity: Utilization is the
number of shares on loan divided by the number of shares available to borrow (Panel A); On Loan is the number
of shares effectively lent out, scaled by total shares outstanding (Panel B); and Short Interest Ratio is the value of
shorted shares reported in Compustat scaled by market capitalization (Panel C). We use the population-weighted
FHFA House Price Index for each region as a measure of house prices to compute housing returns for Boom and
No Boom. For the Diversified category we use the aggregate U.S. FHFA index. Dotted red lines correspond to 5%
and 95% confidence intervals calculated over 500 bootstrapped simulations.
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Figure 4. Relative Performance on Long-Only and Hedged Strategies
This figure plots the cumulative performance from July 2007 through July 2013 of the FHFA House Price Index
(solid line) and that of a trading strategy that combines a long position in the FHFA House Price Index with a
short position on REITs (dashed line). The strategy only shorts REITs when the On Loan measure of short selling
intensity of U.S. diversified REITs is 1.64 standard deviations above the 12-month rolling window mean. The
strategy is based on shorting 50% of the amount in the long position. Panel A shows the returns using REITs in
each U.S. Census’ regions to hedge a long position in individual U.S. Census’ regions FHFA House Price Index
decreases, while Panel B shows returns using diversified REITs’ to hedge against decreases in the U.S. aggregate
FHFA House Price Index. On Loan is the number of shares lent out scaled by market capitalization.
Panel A. Cumulative Returns based on Individual U.S. Census Regions Data
Panel B. Cumulative Returns based on Aggregate U.S. Data
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